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Alaskan Gas 
Late last year, President Reagan signed into 
law a package of "waivers" designed to facil-
itate private-sector financing of  the vast, 
4,800-mile Alaska Natural Gas Transporta-
tion System (ANGTS). Canadian and U.S. 
interests had already begun work on one 
section of the pipeline to bring Canadian gas 
to the lower-48 states, but various U.S. laws 
had impeded construction of the portions 
required to deliver Alaskan North Slope gas. 
The waiver legislation removes those earl ier 
legal impediments-but still does not ensure 
that the private sector will fund the remain-
ing segments. 
Full funding and completion of the system, 
without U.s. or Alaskan government finan-
cial support, will depend upon the market-
ability of Alaskan gas. Specifically, private 
investors will proceed with construction only 
if  they are reasonably confident that Alaskan 
gas can be sold in the lower-48 states at a 
price competitive with alternative fuels. The 
answer to that question rests upon a number 
of highly uncertain factors, such as the ulti-
mate cost of  the system and future price 
trends for natural gas and alternative fuels. 
Size and cost of system 
The fully completed system would provide 
access to the 26 trillion cubic feet of natural-
gas reserves discovered in conjunction with 
the 1968 Prudhoe Bay oil strike. Those re-
serves constitute about 13 percent of  the total 
proved reserves of natural gas in the United 
States. Potential reserves represent another 
100-200 trillion cubic feet of gas-resources 
that eventually might be recoverable at 
higher prices and with more advanced tech-
nology, but which might not be developed 
without a delivery system. Initially, the system 
would deliver 2.0billion cubic feet (bcf) of 
Alaskan natural gas daily to the lower-48 
states. Subsequently, with the construction 
of additional compressor facilities, capac-
ity could be increased to 3.2 bcf/day-
equivalent to 6 percent of current u.s. 
natural-gas requirements. 
The 4,800 mile system would follow estab-
lished rights-of-,ways, highways and pipe-
lines (see map).Jtwould originate at Prudhoe 
Bay, parallel the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline for 
a distance, and then cross into Canada. It 
would separate into Eastern and Western legs 
near Calgary. The Eastern leg would cross the 
Saskatchewan-Montana border and go on to 
Dwight, III i  nois. The Western leg wou  Id cross 
the British Columbia-Idaho border and termi-
nate at Brentwood, California. 
Pipeline firms have already completed por-
tions of the system -the "pre-build" sec-
tions-to bring surplus Canadian gas to 
California and the Midwest. The Canadian 
Western Leg began operations in October, 
1982, with a system authorized to del iver 
up to 300 million cubic feet per day to the 
Western United States. The Canadian Eastern 
Leg is scheduled for completion in the fall of 
1982. But construction has not yet begun on 
the other Canadian segments, the 745-mile 
Alaska pipeline or a proposed gas-condition-
ing plant at Prudhoe Bay. 
Project sponsors estimate the system's con-
struction cost at $26 billion, in 1982 dollars. 
But total cash requirements could reach 
$39-48 billion, on the basis of a 7-11  percent 
inflation rate and a 10-14 percent average 
interest rate over the 1983-87 construction 
period. To date, sponsors have raised just $3 
billion to finance the "pre-build" sections of 
the system. 
Waiver legislation 
Prior to passage of the waiver legislation, the 
1  O-member consortium of natural-gas pipe-
line companies sponsoring the Alaska seg-
ment had reached an agreement with the 
three major North Slope gas producers, call-
ing for the latter to share in the financing of 
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tioning plant. Because of antitrust protections 
contained in earlier laws, however, those 
producers could hold debt but could not own 
equity in the system. 
The waiver legislation removed that and 
other legal obstacles to financing. It permitted 
the Prudhoe Bay producers to hold unlimited 
equity in the Alaska phase of the project. But; 
before the Federal Energy Regulatory Com- " 
mission (FERC) could approve any producer's 
specified ownership share, the Attorney 
General would have to rule that that share 
does not violate antitrust laws, restrict access 
to the line by non-owner shippers, or restrict 
capacity expansion. The legislation also per-
mitted the Alaska natural-gas conditioning 
plant to be included as part of the trans-
portation system so that its costs could be 
included in the rate base charged consumers. 
The legislation also included a controversial 
provision relating to "pre-billing." Under that 
provision, the Commission could approve a 
tariff requiring U.S. customers to be charged 
for individual segments of the system -the 
Canadian pipeline, the Alaskan pipeline, 
and/or the gas-conditioning plant-even if 
the full system is never completed. Billing 
would start upon completion of any segment 
of  the system, after a "date certain" estab-
lished by the Commission as the most likely 
date for commencement ofoperations forthe 
entire system. Project sponsors have submit-
ted November 1, 1987 for consideration as 
the most likely date. 
In pre-biliingtheCanadian portion, theCom-
mission could approve a tariff which recovers 
full cost of service. For the Alaska segments, 
customers would be charged a "minimum" 
bill to cover all costs of service, except a 
return to equity and taxes. Under other provi-
sions of the law, the FERC could eliminate 
formal hearings as a prerequisite for granting 
certificates of  public convenience and neces-
sity for the Alaska segments, but could not 
reduce the tariff below the level necessary to 
recover "minimum" cost. 
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Gas producers' equity participation in the 
Alaska pipeline and conditioning plant 
should help secure additional financing be-
yond the amounts already pledged by the 
original ten pipeline-company sponsors. In 
fact, they are willing to put up 30-percent of 
the equity share, which under current pro-
posals is scheduled to comprise 25 percent of 
the total financing. The producers' strong 
asset position and creditworthiness also 
should help attract the remaining 75 percent 
of the financing to be acquired through the 
issuance of debt. Inclusion of the gas-condi-
tioning plant in the rate base also should 
increase producers' interest in the project, 
because it would assure them an income 
stream to recover debt and interest, once the 
plant is completed after the date certain. But it 
would also raise the cost to consumers, and 
thus increase the difficulty of marketing Alas-
ka gas at a competitive price. 
Similarly, the pre-billing provisions would 
shift some of  the risks of delay and non-
completion from investors to consumers. 
Revenues from the flow of Alaskan gas could 
be delayed as a result of delays in the com-
pletion of any seg'ment, while financing re-
quirements for completed segments would 
continue to mount. For the Canadian seg-
ment, sponsors could begin charging the 
entire cost of service after the scheduled 
completion date for the entire system, even if 
no Alaskan gas is flowing. For the Alaskan 
- segments, however, U.S. sponsors could ob-
tain only partial relief from the risk of non-
completion of the entire system, to the extent 
of the recovery of debt service and limited 
other costs. But owners would still risk their 
equity, and would also shoulder the entire 
risk of non-completion of either the Alaska 
pipeline or gas-conditioning plant, since 
those facilities must be placed in operation 
before owners may recover any associated 
costs. 
Marketability of gas 
These remaining risks suggest that sponsors 
and other investors will not even begin con-
struction of the Alaskan facilities until they are convinced that the entire project can be 
completed and the gas marketed at a price 
competitive with alternative fuels. The de-
livered cost in the early years of the project 
would be high compared with the cost of 
alternative fuels-even ifthe wellhead price 
of Alaska'n gas remained subject to Federal 
controls as specified in the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act of 1978. The controlled price is $1.45 
per thousand cubic feet (the 1977 price) plus 
the subsequent inflation rate. 
The delivered cost at the end of the system 
would have two components: project cost 
and wellhead cost of gas. The House Energy 
and Commerce Committee staff recently es-
timated the delivered cost of Alaskan gas 
during the first year of system operation 
(1987) at $11.40 per thousand cubic feet, 
expressed in 1982 dollars. (That estimate is 
based on a $26-billion project cost and on 
controlled prices for the gas at wellhead.) 
That price, however, wou  Id be more than 
twice the staff's estimate forthe average 1987 
price of fuel oil (in energy equivalent values) 
of $5.32 per thousand cubic feet, expressed 
in 1982 dollars. 
The staff study nonetheless found that Alas-
kan gas could compete with alternative fuels 
(on the average) during the 20-year life of  the 
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project-under certain limiting conditions. 
That eventuality would require the continu-
ation of Federal controls on the wellhead 
price, as well as a drop in the real delivered 
cost of  Alaskan gas and a rise in the real price 
of  alternative fuels over the 20-year I  ife of  the 
project. The staff estimated that the real de-
I  ivered cost of  Alaskan gas might indeed drop 
to around $5.56 per thousand cubic feet 
(in 1982 dollals) over the 20-year life of the 
project, due to such factors as a decline in 
interest payments as a result of a decline in 
unamortized debt. Also, Alaskan gas could 
be competitive with fuel oil, on an average 
long-term basis, if fuel-oil prices rose 3 per-
cent per year or more beyond the annual 
inflation rate over the 20-year period. 
In sum, substantial uncertainties surround the 
future marketability of Alaskan gas. Higher-
than-expected construction or financing 
costs, decontrol of Alaskan gas wellhead 
prices, and declining real oil prices could 
adversely affect the economic viability of  the 
project. On the other hand, lower-than-
expected interest rates and construction 
costs, or an especially sharp increase in 
real oil prices, could facilitate financing 
and construction. 
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3 BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 








































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess ReseNes ( + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reseNes (+ )/Net borrowed(  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
3/24/82  3/17/82 
69  35 
11  107 
58  73 
U018U!4SI'M"  4I'ln ..  uo8oJO ..  I'PI'i\oN  ..  04I'PI 
!!I'MI'H  ..  I'!WOl!IE':)  •  I'uozPV'  ..  I'>jSI'IV' 
I  (G)~<§~~\ill~JJ~ \ill~~ 
~  (G)  ~\ill~C@l 
@AJJ@<§@(Q[  IT~JJ@~@~ 
~  \W~m~JJ~((ll~cm \\U:J)JJ~~<§~CQI 
Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,329  7.0 
11,708  9.4 
5,722  15.8 
5,007  9.7 
72  ;- 0.3 
472  34.0 
525  I- 7.7 
833  I- 5.3 
1,939  I- 4.9 
2,100  - 7.4 
316  1.0 
15,169  19.9 
14,737  21.9 
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